Spoofing GPS Receivers

ACM Technews picked up an article on research at Cornell University showing that global positioning system (GPS) technology is vulnerable to transmitting fake signals that receivers believe are authentic (spoofing).

The Cornell researchers presented a paper on their findings at a meeting of the Institute of Navigation on September 19th in Savannah, GA. Paper co-authors Brent Ledvina, Cornell Ph.D. '07 and now assistant professor of electrical computer engineering at Virginia Tech and Todd Humphreys, Cornell Ph.D. '07 described how a "phony" receiver could be placed in the proximity of a navigation device where it would track, modify, and retransmit signals being transmitted from the GPS satellite constellation. Eventually the "victim" navigation device would misinterpret the counterfeit navigation signals for the real signals.

"GPS is woven into our technology infrastructure, just like the power grid or the water system," said Kintner, Cornell professor of electrical and computer engineering and director of the Cornell GPS Laboratory. "If it were attacked, there would be a serious impact."

See full article in Cornell University's CHRONICALONLINE.